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ABSTRACT 
After WWII, several new countries were born, many of which came to have 
authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regimes depressed civil liberties among their 
peoples, but in some cases, they contributed to their own democratization, ironically, by 
pursuing economic development. ROK President Park Chung Hee seized control of 
political power by coup in 1961. Until he was assassinated in 1979, he acted both as 
dictator of South Korea’s political order and as the founder of South Korean economic 
take-off.  
This thesis first looks into how Park’s administration accomplished economic 
development, unlike the preceding Rhee Syngman regime. This paper finds the intrinsic 
difference from the military bureaucracy and export-oriented industrialization. Also, as 
an extrinsic difference, special demands from the Vietnam War are discussed. The United 
States fully participated in the Vietnam War during the period of Park’s regime. The 
economic effect gained from South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War absolutely 
influenced on the export-oriented economic growth policy implemented by the Park’s 
administration. 
Then, this thesis assesses differences of both countries by comparing Park’s 
regime to Pinochet’s regime in Chile. Both regimes were military governments, but South 
Korea implemented economic development with powerful intervention, and Chile 
fulfilled economic reform with free markets. I examine what brought these two countries 
to take different ways of national economic policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
President Park Chung Hee was the initiator of economic development in South 
Korea after seizing political power in a coup in 1961. Although his military regime 
suppressed civil liberty, it contributed to the rapid economic transformation of South 
Korea. This thesis examines the Park leadership’s promotion of the take-off of South 
Korea’s economy as a comparative case study of the role played by military authoritarian 
regimes in economic development. 
B. CONCEPTUAL SIGNIFICANCE  
After WWII, many countries were created, several of which came to have 
authoritarian regimes. These regimes depressed civil liberties among their peoples, but in 
some cases they contributed to their own democratization, ironically, by pursuing 
economic development. 
The Republic of Korea’s President Park Chung Hee seized control of political 
power by a coup in 1961. Until he was assassinated in 1979, he acted both as dictator of 
South Korea’s political order and as the founder of the South Korean economic take-off.  
According to recent surveys, Park remains the most respected former president among 
South Korea’s people, but there are also those who denigrate his achievements in 
promoting ROK’s economic development because of his dictatorship. 
Generally speaking, authoritarian regimes were widespread among countries of 
low economic development and per capita income. South Korea was the one of the 
poorest countries in the world at the beginning of the 1960s. Nevertheless, by 2007, its 
rank by GNP was thirteenth in the world.   This and other considerations invite 
consideration of the main factors of the economic success under Park’s authoritarian 
regime. If the main factors of these successful results can be located, it may help to 
illuminate understanding of how developing countries achieve economic development. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Approaches to Authoritarianism 
The role of authoritarian regimes in promoting development has not been studied 
as extensively as that of development under democratic regimes. As Dan Slater observed, 
“Democratic institutions have long enjoyed pride of place in comparative politics. By 
comparison, authoritarian institutions remain inadequately conceptualized, theorized, and 
investigated.”1 Studying economic development under authoritarian regimes is not only 
useful in itself but also because it sheds light on contrasts with modernization in 
democratic orders. 
Many developing countries began modernization in the 1950s and 1960s under 
authoritarian regimes. What connection exists between modernization and authoritarian 
regimes?  Talcott Parsons was the foremost advocate of social evolutionism. According 
to his theory, society evolves from barbarism to civilized levels.2 He argued that the 
United States was the most developed of the Western cultures. In his theories, 
modernization requires that a society deny its traditions, which results in social problems. 
His theory was attacked as being ethnocentric and for equating modernization with 
Westernization. 
In Max Weber’s view, modernization means transformation from feudal society 
to modern society.3 This is an economic history viewpoint which sees modernization as 
Eurocentric westernization. Weber divided political domination into three types: 
charismatic domination, traditional domination, and legal domination.4 He insisted that 
the relationship between rulers and subjects can be analyzed by these types of domination 
                                                 
1Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in 
Malaysia," Comparative Politics 36, no. 1 (Oct. 2003), 81-101.    
2 Talcott Parsons, Theories of Society; Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1961).   
3 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free 
Press, 1964).   
4 Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline (London; New York: Routledge, 
1994).    
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and that they constitute a progression in a historical process from charismatic domination 
to traditional domination and finally to legal domination. In charismatic domination, the 
ruler governs the people by extraordinary qualities and exceptional powers.  In the 
traditional domination, leaders possess acquired or inherited qualities, and, in legal 
domination, they rule by rational regulations. Most military regimes during 1950s-1960s 
acquired political power using force and only then established their legitimacy. 
W. W. Rostow developed a major economic growth model. He divided economic 
growth into five stages.5 The first stage is that of a traditional society whose structure is 
developed within limits. The second stage is society in the process of transition. The third 
stage marks a watershed in the life of modern societies. During this time, new industries 
expand rapidly. The fourth stage sees a long interval in the drive to maturity. Finally, 
societies achieve maturity and come into an age of high mass-consumption. Following 
this scheme, authoritarian regimes contribute to the second and third stages. 
According to the social theorist Peter Wagner, modernization is a process.6 In his 
view, structural change progresses in all fields such as politics, economy, society, and 
culture. Structural change begins from undeveloped conditions to more developed 
conditions. Authoritarian regimes were mostly born in underdeveloped conditions and 
provided more developed conditions through economic development. 
2. Perspectives on Developmental States and Authoritarian Regimes 
Seymour Martin Lipset measured modernization of European and Latin-American 
countries during the 1960s by means of several indicators: industrialization, urbanization, 
education, and wealth.7 He observed that more industrialized countries were found in 
more democratic countries in Europe and less dictatorial countries in Latin America. 
These data indicate that there are more possibilities to find authoritarian regimes in 
                                                 
5 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge [Eng.: 
University Press, 1960).   
6 Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline. 
7 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinemann, 1969).   
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developing countries than in developed countries. On that basis, he argued that “the more 
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”8 
Samuel Huntington supported Lipset in his book The Third Wave, noting that “an 
overall correlation exists between the level of economic development and democracy, yet 
no level or pattern of economic development is in itself either necessary or sufficient to 
bring about democratization.” 9  He also stressed the stability of regimes, whether 
democratic or not, and argued that rapid economic development caused instability in the 
authoritarian regimes and compelled the country to liberalize. He stressed that “the 
primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order.” 10 
Authoritarian regimes might seek their legitimacy from the achievements of economic 
development. 
Adam Przeworski also argued that economic development is related to a regime’s 
political type, as shown in Figure 1.11 However, he did not agree with Huntington’s 
argument that rapid growth is not destabilizing in democracies (or in dictatorships). He 
summarized 18 studies about regime type and economic growth, as in Table 1. He 
explained that “among them, eight found in favor of democracy, eight in favor of 
authoritarianism, and five discovered no difference. What is even more puzzling is that 
among the 11 results published before 1988, eight found that authoritarian regimes grew 




                                                 
8 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (Mar. 1959), 69-105.   
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).   
10 Samuel P. Huntington and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs, Political Order in 
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).   
11 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," 
World Politics 49, no. 2 (Jan. 1997).   
12 Adam Przeworski, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy. 71, no. 1996 






Figure 1.   Probability that a regime is democratic, by per capita income. 
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Table 1.   Studies of Democracy, Autocracy, Bureaucracy and Growth. 
Author Sample Time frame Finding 
Przeworski (1966) 57 countries 1949-1963 Dictatorships at medium development 
Adelman (1967) 74 underdeveloped 1950-1964 Authoritarianism helped less and medium 
developed 
Dick (1974) 59 underdeveloped 1959-1968 Democracies develop slightly faster 
Huntington (1975) 35 poor nations The 1950s Authoritarian grew faster 
Marsh (1979) 98 countries 1955-1970 Authoritarian grew faster 
Weede (1983) 124 countries 1960-1974 Authoritarian grew faster 
Kormendi (1985) 47 countries 1950-1977 Democracies grew faster 
Kohli (1986) 10 underdeveloped 1960-1982 No difference in 1960s; authoritarian slightly 
better in 1970s 
Landau (1986) 65 countries 1960-1980 Authoritarian grew faster 
Sloan (1987) 20 Latin American 1960-1979 Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes do better 
than democracies 
Marsh (1988) 47 countries 1965-1984 No difference between regimes 
Pourgerami (1988) 92 countries 1965-1984 Democracies grew faster 
Scully (1988,1992) 115 countries 1960-1980 Democracies grew faster 
Barro (1989) 72 countries 1960-1985 Democracies grew faster 
Grier (1989) 59 countries 1961-1980 Democracy better in Africa and Latin America 
Remmer (1990) 11 Latin American 1982-1988 Democracy faster, but result statistically 
insignificant 
Pourgerami (1991) 106 less developed 1986 Democracies grew faster 
Helliwell (1992) 90 countries 1960-1985 Democracy has a negative, but statistical effect 
on growth 
 
D. THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE 
The military regime under Park Chung Hee launched an export-led growth policy 
from early in his presidency. Haggard, Kim and Moon explained that “the neoclassical 
position traces South Korea’s take-off to a set of policy reforms in 1964 and 1965.” They 
continued by noting that “policy was far from laissez-faire, but on the whole, the reforms 
moved Korea in a more market-oriented direction that sought to exploit Korea’s 
comparative advantage.” The five-year plan was critical to the economic policy of Park. 
With these plans, “the ‘statists,’ by contrast, detail the pervasive intervention of the 
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Korean government in the economy, even after the shift toward an outward-oriented 
strategy. Moreover, the neoclassical position argues that such intervention promoted 
rapid economic growth.”13 
Several studies supported by the World Bank found the relevant factors 
responsible for the rapid growth under President Park’s presidency. R.R. Krishnan 
explained that “among the factors that have been identified are the commitments of the 
political leadership (for 18 years Park Chung Hee 1961-1979 and Chun Doo Hwan since 
1980) to growth through an all out promotion of exports.”14 In addition, the chaebol 
(South Korean business groups) were important actors as exporters. Park encouraged 
chaebols to accumulate capital. Although this approach generated side effects such as 
wealth inequality, corruption between business groups and government, its role was 
critical in the export-led policy. 
The military regime was a strong supporter of the policy. Muthiah Alagappa 
concludes that “in many cases, state coercion played a dominant role in most if not all 
these processes and resulted in military role expansion and a dramatic increase in the 
coercive, organizational, economic, and political power and influence of the military.”15 
Park established social overhead capital (SOC) to develop the economy under his 
power. For example, when he planned to construct the “Kyung-bu Highway,” it was 
widely resisted for the financial reason that South Korea was at that time one of the 
poorest countries. Park nevertheless was himself convinced of the importance of SOC. 
POSCO, now one of the largest steel companies in the world, is a similar case. Park 
ordered General Park Tae-jun to build it. According to Jun Jinsok, “the military in South 
Korea has played an important role in the process of modernization through manpower 
                                                 
13 Stephan Haggard, Byung-kook Kim and Chung-in Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in 
South Korea: 1954-1966," The Journal of Asian Studies 50, no. 4 (Nov. 1991), 850-873.   
14 R. R. Krishnan, "South Korean Export Oriented Regime: Context and Characteristics," Social 
Scientist 13, no. 7/8 (Jul. - Aug. 1985), 90-111.   
15 Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001).   
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training, dissemination of modern methods of organization and management, and active 
participation in the construction of physical infrastructure.”16 
Not all of the policies of the military regime under President Park were 
successful. “However,” Kim Gwang-sik noted, “the military has made an enormous 
contribution to South Korea’s modernization and socioeconomic development. From the 
late 1950s to the late 1970s, the military played an important role in resocializing and 
training.”17 Han Yong-won agrees, stating that “the military has also made a profound 
contribution to the country’s physical infrastructure in the form of roads, highways, 
bridges, and cultivation of farmland and woods.”18 
Developed countries in the West were important models of modernization in 
developing countries. But developing countries’ modernization had many problems. 
Developing countries had to solve not only the process of modernization but also 
problems resulted from adopting modernization. They also had to deal with democracy, 
which is difficult in the beginning phase of modernization. Authoritarian regimes 
typically use force to achieve internal consolidation. By doing so, political stability could 
be accomplished, providing the ground for economic development. Muthiah Alagappa 
explained: 19 
Coercion plays a central role as well in the structure and process of 
political domination. Rulers in a number of Asian countries rely on 
coercion to maintain their position and secure compliance from their 
citizens and subjects. State coercion was a crucial pillar of the Syngman 
Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan governments in South Korea; 
Mao Zedong’s rule in China; the Kuomintang-led governments in Taiwan 
until 1987; the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines; and the military 
governments in Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. 
 
                                                 
16 Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001): 121. 
17 Gwang-sik Kim, "Goon-Sahoi Gwangye 5onyeon: Hoigowa Jeonmang" (Seoul, 
Hangookgookbangyeongoowon, 1998). 
18 Yong-won Han, "Gookgabaljeongwa Gooneui Yeokhal" (Seoul, Hangookgookbangyeongoowon, 
1998). 
19 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. 
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To develop a country’s economy in a short time, authoritarian regimes can be 
efficient even though there may be side effects. An authoritarian government has to 
overcome the resistance of citizens who want to introduce a more intensive democracy or 
maintain the traditional values. If developing countries can reform their economic 
structures successfully, they can change their political structures with relatively little 
conflict between the demands of the citizens and the fulfillment of the government. This 
thesis will suggest favorable solutions for economic development under authoritarian 
regimes. 
1. Chile as a Case Study 
In the Chilean case, President Pinochet’s military regime had an important role in 
developing the economy. While Park Chung-hee pursued economic development by 
powerful state intervention, Pinochet implemented economic reform by means of a free 
market. The rapid free market economic reform of Chile by Pinochet spread to other 
South American countries. In this thesis, the author assesses why Korea intended 
economic development through government intervention and Chile selected a free market 
although both countries were lead by military governments. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis draws on the literature on modernization in authoritarian regimes.  In 
researching the comparative case studies of South Korea and Chile, important main 
sources include South Korean and Chilean government documents, scholarly books, 
economic journals and periodicals published not only in English but also in Korean. 
Economic data or reports from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Trade Organization have also been drawn upon. 
F. THESIS SYNOPSIS 
This thesis first looks into how Park’s administration accomplished economic 
development, unlike Rhee Syngman’s regime. This thesis focuses on the intrinsic 
differences between the military bureaucracy and export-oriented industrialization. Also, 
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as an extrinsic difference, special demands from the Vietnam War will be discussed. The 
United States participated fully in the Vietnam War during the period of Park’s regime. 
The economic effect gained from South Korea participation in the Vietnam War 
absolutely influenced its export-oriented economic growth policy implemented by the 
Park administration. 
Finally, this thesis analyses the political differences between both countries by 
comparing Park’s regime to Pinochet’s regime. Both regimes were military governments, 
but South Korea implemented economic development with powerful intervention by the 
government, and Chile fulfilled economic reform with a free market. The thesis assesses 





II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER PRESIDENT PARK 
AND LEE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
South Korea declared independence after World War II and has accomplished 
dramatic economic development through export-oriented growth policy since the 1960s. 
The economic development of South Korea has been called as an “East Asian Miracle,” 
NICs (Newly Industrializing Country), a NIEs (Newly Industrializing Economy), or a 
HPAEs (High Performing Asian Economy).20 Also, after the mid-1960s, particularly, in 
the 1970s, South Korea was called a BAIR (bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing 
regime).21 
The annual growth rate of HPAEs eight countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) has been 5.5 percent for 30 
years since 1965.22 This is two times higher than OECD countries, which is a group of 
advanced countries, three times higher than Latin America and South Asia, and 25 times 
higher than African countries below the Sahara.23 
In particular, South Korea’s average growth rate of GNP in the 1960s was 10 
percent. It was the most amazing speed among other HPAEs countries. 24  It was 
impossible to see this growth rate in the 1950s when South Korea was one of the poorest 
countries in the world, after liberation in 1945. In the 1950s, the first President of Korea, 
Rhee Syng-man, ran the country, and President Park’s military regime governed Korea in  
 
                                                 
20 Mark T. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004): 3. 
21 Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: 
Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," International Organization 38, no. 1 
(Winter 1984), 1-40: 28.  
22Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization: 230. 
23 Jong Suh Koo, "Developmental Model of East-Asia and Korea," The Korean Political Science 
Association 30, no. 2 (Aug. 1996), 209-224.   
24Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial 
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, 1-40: 1. 
 12
the 1960s. How could President Park’s administration achieve such high growth? This 
paper will compare Rhee’s government and Park’s military government in terms of 
economic development. 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARK’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LEE’S 
After its independence in 1945, Korea was divided into North and South Korea 
and they have confronted each other. Although South Korea held an election separately 
and elected Rhee Syng-man as the first President, social unrest continued and communist 
guerrillas connected to North Korea frequently appeared.25 Moreover, the Korean War in 
1950 devastated the Korean peninsula. Rhee administration, which had to depend on U.S. 
aid, implemented import-substituting development, but political stability was a more 
urgent matter than economic development for the newly independent nation. Although 
there was economic growth, it was mainly because of the restoration of damages from the 
Korean War, and reconstruction of the basic infrastructure including power, basic 
industries.26  
On the contrary, Park’s military government, which came into power by a coup in 
1961, drove export-oriented industrialization (EOI) and accomplished dramatic economic 
development compared to Rhee administration. Thanks to the cold war system in the 
world, a powerful military regime was able to remain, and the Vietnam War in the 1960s 
helped Korea to begin EOI. Furthermore, the military was the only powerful and 
systematic organization in Korea following the Korean War. With support of the military, 
Park’s government could drive a powerful export-oriented policy. Particularly, the policy 
of the cultivation of heavy and chemical industries in 1970s upgraded Korea’s EOI with 
conglomerates’ full-fledged growth. 
This chapter examines two factors that enabled Park’s regime to accomplish 
economic growth than Rhee’s administration. 
                                                 
25Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial 
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, 1-40: 23. 
26 Edward Reynolds Wright and Suk-choon Cho, Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: Published for 
the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, by the University of Washington Press, 1975): 244. 
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- Military bureaucracy: Although technocrats of Rhee’s government could not play 
a proper bureaucracy role due to the political situation, Park’s government was able to 
form a powerful bureaucracy dominated by the government. 
- Export-oriented industrialization: Although Rhee’s regime implemented an 
import-substitution program, it was insufficient to maintain consistent economic growth. 
The GDP growth rate of Rhee’s government continuously decreased. On the contrary, 
Park’s government accomplished high-speed economic growth through export-oriented 
industrialization. Since South Korea was a lack of natural resources, increasing export 
through industrialization was the best option for economic development. 
C. THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY 
1. Political Side 
Park Chung-hee had promised to hand over his government to a civilian 
government after the coup, but he ran for President as a representative of the Democratic 
Republican Party (DRP). The DRP had been organized by Kim Jong-pil, who was a core 
member of the coup. Park’s military government greatly strengthened the power of 
President through constitutional reform. The President then could appoint cabinet 
members including the prime minister, and limit the freedom of the press, assembly and 
speech. In addition, he limited political activities of political parties through a political 
party law.27 
President Park’s peers in the military supported him. The leading powers in the 
Park regime were military leaders. Many of them had crossed the border into Manchuria 
in the colonial era and entered the Manchurian Military Academy. And, some of them 
who had achieved excellent grades entered the Japanese Military Academy. Park Chung 
Hee also graduated from the Manchurian and Japanese Military Academies. Park Chung 
Hee appointed his subordinates to important positions in the government. For example, 
General Jung Il-Kwon became Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and the Speaker. 
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873: 858. 
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General Lee Han-Lim, Park’s military academy colleague, became the Minister of 
Construction. General Baek Sun-Yon became the Minister of Transportation. Cho 
explained,  
In terms of social and political backgrounds, the Korean government 
bureaucracy contains three layers of higher civil servants. … Those 
belonging to the third category are ex-military men who entered the higher 
civil service after the military coup d’etat of 1961. Some 14.08 percent of 
higher civil servants had been in the military immediately before joining 
the civil service. This percentage increases in the higher ranks; in 1965, 
56.12 percent of the age group of 36 to 40 were ex-military men.28  
And the then leaders were more likely to be in their 30s compared to the previous regime 
as seen in the table below.29 
Table 2.   Percent Distribution of SCNR members by Age Compared with 
Leadership during the Rhee and Chang Regimes. 
 Over 80 70-79 60-69 50-59 40-49 30-39 
Leadership, aRhee regime 
(Age as of 1959) 1.4 4.7 29.1 38.5 24.3 2.0 
Leadership, aChang regime 
(Age as of 1960) 0 0 27.9 36.1 32.5 3.5 
Members, SCNR, bJune 61, Jan. 
62, Dec. 62, or Dec. 63 
(Age as of 1961) 
0 0 0 0 22.5 77.5 
a. Adapted from Hahn Bae-ho and Kim Kyu-taik, “Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social 
Origins and Skills,” Asian Survey, Vol. 3 (July 1963), p. 314. Composition of the leadership groups is 
described in the text of the present study and in the study cited. 
b. Percentages computed with N: 40. Data on date of birth were unavailable for 8 SCNR members. 
 
Kim said, “Aside from such quantitative advancement to positions of influence, 
there is a qualitative influx of former generals and colonels into key governmental 
offices-from the head of state down to the bureau chiefs in the more sensitive positions.” 
Like this, South Korea could establish powerful military bureaucracy for the economic 
development under government guidance.30 The following list of key officials and their 
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30Haggard, Kim and Moon, The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966, 850-
873: 851. 
 15
former military ranks shows the extent of military entrenchment in the governmental 
process as of the winter of 1969. (See Table 3)31  
Table 3.   Key Officials in Park’s Military Government 
Department Name Rank* 
The President of the Republic Park Chung-hee General, Army 
Presidential Secretariat Senior Secretaries 
(Political Affairs) Kim Sang-bok Lt. General, Army 
Civil Affairs Yu Song-won Brig. General, Army 
Public Information Kang Sang-uk Brig. General, Army 
Protocol Cho Sang-ho Colonel, Army 
General Affairs Kim Won-hui Brig. General, Army 
Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Kye-won Lt. General, Army 
The Prime Minister Chung Il-gwon General, Army 
The Minister of Defense Chung Nae-hyok Lt. General, Army 
The Minister of Home Affairs Park Kyong-won Lt. General, Army 
The Minister of Construction Yi Han-rim Lt. General, Army 
The Minister of Transportation Paik Son-yop General, Army 
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Cho Si-hyong Maj. General, Army 
The Chairman, Committee of Agriculture and 
Forestry, the National Assembly Yi Chong-gun Brig. General, Army 
The Chairman, Committee on Commerce and 
Industry, the National Assembly Kil Chong-sik Colonel, Army 
The Chairman, Committee of Foreign Affairs, the 
National Assembly Cha Chi-chol Army 
The Chairman, Committee on Home Affairs, the 
National Assembly Yi Sang-mu Colonel, Army 
The Chairman, Judiciary Committee, the National 
Assembly No Chee-pil Brig. General, Army 
The Chairman, Committee on National Defense, the 
National Assembly Min Pyong-hwon Lt. General, Army 
The Chairman, Committee on Steering and Planning, 
the National Assembly Yi Pyong-whi Colonel, Army 
* All ranks are those held at the time of retirement from active duty. 
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His subordinates played a big role in the assembly as well as in the 
administration. The major members of the DRP were military people. As a result of his 
electoral victory, Park could strongly execute the government policy, placing his 
subordinates in the main policy departments of the government. 
Table 4.   Principal Occupations of Founding Members of DRP32 
Occupation Number Occupation Number 
Military 20 Law 4 
Education 13 Banking 2 
Politics 8 Medicine 1 
Press 7 Artist 1 
Commerce 7 Total 70 
Bureaucracy 7   
 
Having suffered through the Korean War (1950-53), the military appeared as the 
only organization with structural power in South Korea.33 The number of soldiers was 
75,000 in 1950, but increased to 600,000 after the war, and 700,000 in 1956. It became 
one of the largest militaries in the world.34 Cumings gave two meanings in respect to this 
big military.35 First, the Korean military took a role of defense at the front line of the 
Cold War. The confrontation status between North Korea supported by the Soviet Union 
and China, and South Korea supported by U.S. provided an advantageous international 
environment where a powerful military government had to remain. Even though the 
Korean War was suspended, the threat from North Korea still remained, and the political 
role of the Korean military remained the same.36 Second, many young Koreans were 
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educated by the military in technology and letters, and military officers had learned 
leadership in military. All young men in Korea had to provide mandatory service to the 
military, and the military taught them the technology and organizational culture necessary 
to work in the general society after discharge. This second factor minimized objections 
against Park’s military regime about its lack of legitimacy. 
2. Economic Side 
Unlike Rhee’s government, Park’s military regime concentrated its power on the 
administration to prepare an organization basis for economic growth. These organizations 
were blocked from political stakeholders, and implemented powerful economic growth 
policies. The power of Park’s military government and political insulation were important 
factors for accomplishing market-conforming strategy. A small cadre of technocrats tried 
economic reform during Rhee’s government but failed since they were not the main 
power. However, Park’s government formed a powerful bureaucracy through 
restructuring and also appointed various specialists to government departments.37 The 
role of bureaucracy is also pointed to as a factor common to high-speed economic growth 
in East Asia.38 
The economic policies of Park’s government were mainly swayed by the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) which had authority over economic and budget 
planning. Since the EPB had a powerful authority over the allocation of resources as well 
as economic development, their influence on the overall economy of South Korea was 
tremendous.39  Furthermore, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI, later the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, or MTI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) were 
established as financial supervisors to control companies financially. The government 
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conducted instruction and provided supervision companies, and if a company 
accomplished its goal, the government provided attractive incentives.40 
D. EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The Korean economy greatly depended on aid from the U.S. in the 1950s. From 
1953-1960, U.S. aid accounted for 70 percent of total imports. The main purpose of the 
aid was stabilization, but the U.S. was skeptical about Korea’s economic growth.41 
Rhee’s government had put priorities on political issues to confront communist North 
Korea rather than an economic development.42 
Rhee’s regime implemented import-substituting programs as an economic policy. 
Major industries at that time were textiles, cement and flat glass.43 The textile industry in 
particular, was an important axis of economic growth in the 1950s.44 Cotton spinning had 
begun in the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945) and had been a major part of Korean 
industry even after export-oriented industrialization in the 1960’s as well as import-
substituting industrialization in the 1950s.45 Domestic industries were protected by tariffs 
and foreign currency policies,46 and it was relatively easy for domestic companies to 
approach the U.S. market due to the U.S. government’s aid policy.47 
However, the stabilization and import-substituting program did not guarantee 
consistent economic development. The GNP growth continuously dropped after peak of 
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7.7 percent in 1957 (See Table 5). This policy only could not develop Korea's poor 
economic structure. Effective political structure had to support continuous economic 
growth. Unfortunately, Rhee’s government had no ability to change its ineffective 
political structure.48 
Table 5.   GNP Growth between 1957 and 1960 
 1953-55 1957 1958 1959 1960 
GNP growth (%) Korean War 7.7 5.2 3.9 1.9 
 
Haggard explained Rhee's import-substituting economic strategy as follows:49 
In the 1950s, the financial weakness of the ruling Liberal Party and its 
declining political fortunes made it rational for Syngman Rhee to 
maximize his dependence on aid, limit the domain of coherent planning, 
and maintain discretionary control over a variety of policy instruments in 
order to build political support. These political factors help explain the 
particular nature of South Korea’s experience with a predominantly 
import-substituting economic strategy in the 1950s. 
 
McNamara argued: 50 
But the wider picture of uneven growth and then stagnation in the local 
economy, blatant collusion with industry to gain funds for election 
campaigns, and inconsistent economic planning and implementation 
hardly suggests an effective role in the wider economy for the state of the 
First Republic. Intent on political survival, the administration failed to 
provide clear economic direction or even commit itself to a comprehensive 
development plan. … Rhee’s overriding priority on political rather than 
economic mobilization, and growing reliance on the business sector for 
funds to maintain his Liberal Party. 
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Park’s military regime effectively changed Rhee’s import substituting 
industrialization (ISI) into export-oriented industrialization (EOI), and powerfully drove 
export-oriented policies. Park’s policy re-established the relationship between the 
government and companies. Companies received incentives from the government and the 
government began to discipline companies.51 
The export-oriented policy, the most successful economic factor of South Korea 
since the 1960’s, was not planned by Park’s regime at first. His first economic 
development plan was to inherit the previous regime’s import substituting 
industrialization plan.52 However, Park changed the development strategy to an export-
oriented industrialization in 1964.53 He pursued the transition from a “Domestic-oriented 
economic system” which basically pursued restoration from war damage and 
stabilization, to an “Export-oriented economic system.” This was because Korea was not 
a large-scale domestic market and lacked natural resources. Since Korea had cheap and 
highly educated labor power, it was logical to manufacture products in the country with 
imported raw materials and export them to other countries.  In this period, the 
geopolitical environment was also advantageous to South Korea. Due to the Cold War, 
the U.S. provided tremendous aid and a market for South Korea.54 
Table 6.   Weight of Import and Export for U.S. among Total Import and Export in 
1960-80 
 (Unit: %) 
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Weight of export to U.S. 11.1 35.2 47.3 30.2 26.3 
Weight of import from 
U.S. 38.9 39.3 29.5 25.9 21.9 
*sources: the Korea Bank, ECOS DB 
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Im explained that: 55 
Due to the success of the export platform, the South Korean economy 
grew 9.6 percent per annum and created 2.9 million new jobs between 
1963 and 1972. The economic structure changed radically. While 
agriculture’s share of total domestic production dropped from 45.2 percent 
to 29.5 percent, the industrial manufacturing sector’s share increased from 
17.1 percent to 35.2 percent between 1960-1962 and 1970-1972. The 
export platform led the GNP growth. Between 1963 and 1973, the export 
sector provided 39.9 percent of the total GNP growth compared to 4.5 
percent between 1955 and 1963. 
South Korea entered into a take off stage in the mid-1960s through export-
oriented industrialization.56 After converting its industrialization policy for economic 
stabilization and import-substitution into an export-oriented strategy of labor-intensive 
light industries, it gradually expanded to heavy industries. In the early 1970’s, the 
government decided to intensively cultivate the heavy and chemical industry sector. In 
order to do so, the government established “Promoting Committee for Heavy and 
Chemical Industry” (March 1973) with the Chairman of the Minister of Economic 
Planning Board. This committee took the lead in industrialization. Its policy also 
considered the necessity to defense industry through its development of heavy and 
chemical industry because of the threat of North Korea and the possibility of withdrawal 
of U.S. forces. Moreover, the heavy industry economic development plans of Japan after 
WWII greatly influenced Park Chung-hee.57 
Thanks to the powerful cultivation policy of the government, the ratio of heavy 
and chemical industries to the production of manufacturing industries rapidly increased to 
53.6 percent in 1980 from 39.2 percent in 1970, and the ratio out of total exporting 
increased to 41.5 percent from 12.8 percent. Since the economy of scale is essential to 
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heavy and chemical industries, the cultivation of these industries became an opportunity 
for large companies’ full-fledged growth. Given full support from the government, large 
companies advanced into petrochemical, steel, cement, shipbuilding and machinery 
industries, and finally Samsung Electronics, POSCO, Daewoo shipbuilding, Hyundai 
Heavy were developed.58 
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III. VIETNAM WAR AS AN ECONOMIC CATALYST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, Korea fell under the control of the United States, but the U.S. 
did not have any clear policy for Korea. South Korea did not draw much attention from 
the United States until the Korean War broke out in 1950. The Korean War was a big 
event and announced the start of the Cold War in Asia. The Korea Peninsula was Asia’s 
Berlin, torn into two. North Korea was supported by communist China and Soviet Russia 
and South Korea was supported by the U.S.59 Kang said, “When the U.S. government 
pursued a containment policy vis-à-vis Communist countries, South Korea functioned as 
an advance defense element of the U.S. security system.”60 
The Untied States had aided South Korea since 1945 when Korea became 
independent. Yi said, “During the first two decades after South Korea’s independence, 
the United States infused more than $6.6 billion in aid – $3.8 billion in economy and $2.8 
billion in military.” 61 However, South Korea had been one of the poorest nations in the 
world with less than $100 of the national per capita income until 1960. Robert Komer, a 
senior staffer at the National Security Council (NSC) and later Lyndon Johnson’s senior 
adviser, pointed out, “the long and frustrating record of U.S. involvement in Korea [had] 
so little to show for it.” 62  
The frustrated development of Korea improved in the 1960s. President Park, who 
put economic development as his first priority, accomplished successful economic 
development and Korea did not need aid from the U.S. any more. The major diplomatic 
issues between South Korea and the U.S. in the 1960s were normalization of Korea’s 
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relationship with Japan and dispatching troops to Vietnam. 63 These issues arose from the 
Cold War. This paper will review the foreign policies of the U.S. and South Korea during 
the Vietnam War and its impact on the South Korean economy. 
B. THE NORMALIZATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN AND JAPAN 
Despite long-term aid, South Korea was still unstable politically and still poor and 
underdeveloped. The United States had expected Japan to do something for Korea. Han 
said, “friendship and cooperation between South Korea and Japan would lessen the U.S. 
defense burden in East Asia.”64 In 1962, President John F. Kennedy asked Japan to 
cooperate with economic aid for Korea65 and the Johnson administration operated “every 
conceivable and effective means” for normalizing diplomatic relations between Korea 
and Japan.66 In 1964, David Bell, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(AID) mentioned Japan as “another economic aid source” to help Korea and tried to have 
the economic burden shared with Japan to fight against Communism. The United States 
thought that South Korea’s economy would benefit from forming a relationship under 
which South Korea would provide cheap labor to Japan, and in turn, Japan would provide 
capital to South Korea. Thus, the U.S. saw the normalization of diplomatic relations 
between the two nations as the first thing to be completed.67 
The Untied States had kept exercising its political influence on both nations to 
normalize their relations since the Korean War. In 1964, William P. Bundy, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, emphasized the importance of the 
normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan as follows:68 
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The Republic of Korea stands as a bulwark against the forces of 
aggression that threaten the peace of the Far East, and the security of 
Japan is vitally connected with the ability of the Korean people to 
maintain their independence and to develop a strong and prosperous 
economy. (In Japan) Normalization of relations between Korea and Japan 
would be an important contribution to the cause of peace in Asia. (In 
South Korea) 
The normalization was also essential in struggling against the military threat of 
Communism in Asia. 69 Even though the two nations had provided military bases to the 
U.S. as important allies of the U.S., Korea and Japan had broken off diplomatic relations 
since World War II. Especially, the appearance of Communist China, armed with nuclear 
weapons, further reinforced the necessity of normalization. In 1964, President Park and 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed the influence of China on the security of Pacific 
free nations and agreed that the normalization of diplomatic relations between South 
Korea and Japan would contribute to the interest of those nations in the region. Kim said, 
“The growth of Chinese power made it more urgent than ever before, … Normalization 
of relations between the two countries would be the first step toward closer future 
political and military cooperation among the ROK, the United States, and Japan.” 70  
South Koreans could not easily forget their sufferings during the Japanese 
colonial period. President Rhee was not cooperative in the matter of normalization. 
However, it was indispensable to maintain a cooperative relationship with Japan, an ally 
of the U.S.71 Park Chung Hee was well aware of this. First of all, he prioritized economic 
development over other national policies and needed Japan's financial support to achieve 
his goal of economic development. Warfare compensation might have been an important 
financial resource for economic development.72 Despite the people’s objections, Park 
normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965 and received warfare compensation. 
This compensation was used as important funding for South Korea’s economic 
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development. Koh said, “Japan’s agreement to provide South Korea with $300 million in 
grants, $200 million in government loans, and $300 million in private commercial credits 
over a ten-year (1966-1975) period… It paved the way for an influx of Japanese capital 
and technology, which played a key role in South Korea’s economic modernization.” 73 
Table 7.   Japan’s Economic Cooperation with South Korea, 1964-197574 
 (Unit: $1000) 




1964 – – – 380 380 
1965 – – – 67,777 67,777 
1966 42,041 44,677 – 67,125 111,802 
1967 32,539 28,911 – 36,249 65,160 
1968 27,979 17,846 – 107,884 125,730 
1969 24,058 11,073 – 70,489 81,562 
1970 25,994 8,899 – 56,163 65,062 
1971 29,204 8,000 123,718 78,793 210,511 
1972 29,784 34,900 130,000 76,994 241,894 
1973 29,338 5,029 55,023 60,748 120,800 
1974 26,669 41,521 181,000 142,879 365,400 
1975 32,394 – 40,000 18,400 58,400 
Total 300,000 200,856 529,741 783,881 1,514,518 
 
Japan also had various opinions concerning normalization but Japan was more 
cooperative in the matter of the normalization because of pressure from the United States 
and the burden of defending against emerging China. Asahi Shimbun described these 
necessities as follows:75 
To help the ROK will be to strengthen the bulwark of the anti-Communist 
forces against North Korea and Communist China. If the ROK is 
controlled by North Korea and if Pusan [the Korean port across from 
Japan] is covered by red flags, Japan will be flooded by mountainous 
waves of Communist forces. 
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C. SOUTH KOREA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Untied States had experienced the risk of Communism spreading through the 
Korean War and was concerned about the possibility that it could experience the same 
thing in Vietnam.76 President Lyndon Johnson hoped South Korea would contribute to 
prevent Communist expansion in Vietnam. In 1965, he sent his personal letter of 
“encouragement” to Korea and expressed his desire that Korea dispatch a combat 
division to Vietnam. Moreover, W. Averell Harriman, a special presidential envoy of 
President Johnson, visited Korea to discuss this matter. South Korea seriously considered 
whether to send troops to Vietnam and decided to dispatch some. In early January and 
late February 1966, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey came to Korea to discuss the 
additional dispatch of Korean troops.77 And South Korea and the U.S. agreed with the 
Brown Memorandum: 78 
On March 7, 1966, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Winthrop G. Brown, 
delivered to the South Korean government a 14-point memorandum 
[Brown Memorandum] in connection with the dispatch of the second 
Korean military division in Vietnam. … Main point in the Memorandum 
include: (1) modernization of Korean armed forces with new weapons 
over the next two years; (2) supply of new and special equipment to 
counter North Korean infiltration; (3) assumption of expenses by the U.S. 
relative to the dispatch of additional troops and their replacement in 
Korea; (4) prompt availability of the AID loan fund originally agreed upon 
at the May, 1965 meeting of President Johnson and Park; (5) increase of 
employment opportunity in Vietnam for Korean technicians. In 
subsequent action, the U.S. also agreed to grant additional monetary 
benefits for Korean troops in Vietnam. 
The Untied States would gain the followings from South Korea’s involvement in 
the Vietnam War:79 
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By agreeing to dispatch combat troops on a significant scale, South Korea 
helped to fulfill a number of functions for the United States: (1) it 
promoted the goal of bringing “more flags” to Vietnam, thereby further 
internationalizing the conflict; (2) it condsiderably lessened the U.S. 
military burden; (3) it helped to reduce the cost of the war to the United 
States; and (4) it contributed to the American military objectives in 
Vietnam. 
Given the circumstance, where South Korea was confronted by North Korea, 
sending troops to Vietnam might have had a great influence on the security of South 
Korea. People opposed to Korea’s dispatch of troops suggested that North Korea might 
take advantage of the weakening of South Korea’s military security and might attempt to 
attack once again. People who agreed with sending troops said that dispatching troops to 
Vietnam would be one way to return the help the free world gave to South Korea during 
the Korea War as well as to prevent Communism from spreading.80  
South Korea would seem to benefit mainly two things from its decision to 
dispatch troops to Vietnam. First, South Korea could strengthen the U.S and South Korea 
alliance.81 Second, South Korea was able to gain a lot economically. First of all, Park 
Chung Hee could not ignore the economic effects on South Korea’s economy of 
dispatching troops to Vietnam. South Korea had witnessed that Japan’s economy 
recovered thanks to special demands during the Korea War. Even though the size of 
special demands was smaller than those Japan enjoyed during the Korea War, special 
demands during the Vietnam War were very helpful for the export-oriented economic 
development policy the Park Chung Hee administration was about to start in those 
days.82 Koo summarized the factors leading South Korea to decide to dispatch troops to 
Vietnam as follows: 83 
Although the reasons for Korea’s dispatch of combat forces were not 
neatly crystallized in the Korean mind, three justifications for the sending 
of forces to Vietnam stand out: (1) Repayment of the debt for assistance 
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rendered during the Korean conflict by the United States and other 
nations; (2) The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam might endanger the 
security of many Asian nations including Korea; (3) Enhancement of 
Korea’s national prestige, as well as economic and other benefits. 
D. THE IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON SOUTH KOREA’S 
ECONOMY 
Before sending troops to Vietnam, Korea was seriously lacked dollars. The aid 
from the U.S. had rapidly decreased to $131.4 million in 1965 from $382.9 million in 
1957. 84 The trade balance was always in deficit even though exports increased, since the 
more was exported, the more raw materials and machinery had to be imported. Therefore, 
Korea’s foreign-exchange reserves were decreasing. In this situation, the Vietnam War 
greatly contributed to improving Korea’s economic situation. As Japan achieved 
economic growth thanks to the Korean War in the early 1950s, the economic growth of 
Korea largely depended on the special demands of the Vietnam War between the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Kim explained:85 
In summary, both in terms of immediate and long-term effects on the 
nation’s economy, the Vietnam War represents the watershed of the 
economic growth just as the Korean War helped Japan leap into the 
expansion stage from its recovery period. It may be noted that the $380 
million income ($580 million estimated by the end of 1969), so far from 
Vietnam, is relatively greater than the $800 million which that per capita 
income in Japan in 1951 was $136, only two dollars more than that of 
South Korea in 1967. 
1. Inflow of Foreign Capital 
As mentioned in the Brown Memorandum, the U.S. committed more economic 
aid to Korea as the price for its participation in the Vietnam War. This financial aid from 
the U.S. was absolutely necessary for the export-oriented economic growth of Park’s 
regime. Yi explained: 86 
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In 1966 when South Korea increased its forces in South Vietnam to 
50,000, Washington provided Seoul with $10 million in program loans 
and $70 million in project loans. For fiscal year 1967, Korea received $15 
million in program and $57 in project loans. The United States also 
indirectly funneled its capital to South Korea via the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) to which the Johnson administration contributed $200 
million at its founding in December 1965, as a regional cooperative 
financial institution designed to foster economic growth in Asia. … South 
Korea became one of the largest recipients of ADB loans with $111 
million borrowed in total by the end of the 1960s. 
The U.S. also increased military aid in addition to economic aid to Korea. Before 
1965, the U.S. actually had decreased military aid to Korea, but the amount increased 
greatly with Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. Thanks to the military aid from 
the U.S., Park’s administration could lessen the speed of spending for military expenses 
despite North Korea’s threat such as attacking the Blue House and the USS Pueblo 
abduction in 1968. The spared expenses were invested in economic growth. 
Table 8.   Summary of Economic and Military Assistance to South Korea from the 
United States87 
($ Million for U.S. Fiscal Year) 
 1945-52 1953-61 1962-69 1970-76 Total 
Economic Aid 666.8 2,579.2 1,658.2 963.6 5,745.4 
Military Aid 12.3 1,560.7 2,501.3 2,797.4 6.847.3 
Total 679.1 4,139.9 4,159.5 3,761.0 12,592.1 
 
Korea not only sent soldiers but also workers in many areas. Dollars they earned 
greatly contributed to increasing Korea’s foreign exchange reserves. Exporting to 
Vietnam and the revenues earned by workers in Vietnam accounted for 45.7 percent of 
Korea’s foreign exchange reserves in 1968. Kim said, “The 1968 earnings of $180 
million represented 16 percent of the total receipts of foreign funds and 2.8 percent of 
South Korea’s GNP.” 88 
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Table 9.   South Korea’s Earnings from South Vietnam, 1965-6889 
 1965 1966 1967 1968 
U.S. Forces in Vietnam 184,000 385,000 485,000 536,000 
Korean Forces in Vietnam 20,000 46,000 48,000 50,000 
Korean Civilian Workers in 
Vietnam 100 10,200 16,000 20,000 
Korean Exports to Vietnam $18.4 $23.9 $22.0 $37.9 
Goods and Services Sold to U.S. 
Military  $8.3 $35.5 $46.1 
Construction  $4.5 $8.7 $10.7 
Remittance from Korean Laborers 
Hired by U.S. Companies in 
Vietnam 
 $9.7 $39.3 $42.3 
Total Civilian Earnings $18.4 $46.4 $105.5 $137 
Remittance by Korean Soldiers  $15.2 $37.8 $41.9 
Korea’s Total Vietnam Earnings $18.4 $61.6 $143.3 $178.9 
Korea’s Gold and Foreign 
Exchange Reserve $146 $245 $356 $391 
Total Earnings from Vietnam in 
Relation to its Gold and Foreign 
Exchange Reserve 
12.6% 25.1% 40.2% 45.7% 
Note: All monetary figures are in millions. 
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Table 10.   Korean Civilian Laborers in South Vietnam (as of May, 1968)90 
Type of Work Number of Workers 
Machinist 2,775 
Electrician 1,461 
Heavy Machinery Operator 1,423 
Driver 1,344 
Common Laborer 1,217 
Communication 914 
Carpentry 899 
Office Work (white collar) 688 
Security Guard 349 
Architect 335 
Cook and Domestic Service 309 
Other Services 1,101 
 
Korea’s foreign exchange reserves consistently increased after the Vietnam War, 
and reached to $386 million in October 1968. Reserves greatly increased from $138 
million in 1965 when Korea began participation in the Vietnam War.91 The improvement 
of foreign exchange reserves helped the inflow of foreign capital. Kim said, “In 1968, the 
import of capital goods from foreign funds jumped to $350 million, as compared with 
$240 million in 1967, and a mere $48 million in 1965.” 92 The inflow of foreign capital 
played an important role for the export-oriented policy driven by the Park administration. 
Han explained: 93 
Between 1965 and 1969 [South Korea’s] total Vietnam earnings from such 
sources as military commodity procurement, war risk insurance premiums, 
contracts for services, construction contracts, remittances of military and 
civilian personnel, and commercial exports, amounted to $546 million, some 
16 percent of total foreign receipts or about 2 percent of GNP for the same 
period. Earnings for the entire period of Korean participation (1965-1973) are 
estimated to have been at least $1 billion, without counting the increase in 
direct U.S. economic and military aid to Korea. The “Vietnam earnings”  
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became available during a critical stage in Korea’s economic development, 
when large amounts of international liquidity were needed for the rapid 
expansion of export industries. 
2. Increased Exporting 
As mentioned before, Park’s Administration drove export-oriented policies. 
However, since Korea had no experience in pioneering overseas markets, securing 
markets was the most important matter for Korea. Under those circumstances, Vietnam 
provided an important market for Park’s administration. Korea’s exports increased 
suddenly due to the participation in the Vietnam War. In 1968, Korea’s exports and 
imports increased by 100 percent and 300 percent respectively compared to 1965 when 
Korea first sent combat forces, and the rate of GNP growth was 12 percent annually.94 
Park explained: 95 
South Korea’s involvement in Vietnam provided a spur to light industry 
and exports. During the Vietnam War (1965-73), South Korea earned over 
$2 billion from a combination of military and civilian activities in 
Vietnam and increased its exports to Vietnam. Utilizing its links with the 
USA during the war, South Korea exported cement, fertilizers, petroleum 
products and consumer items such as textiles, shoes and plywood. The 
receipts from this represented approximately 19 per cent of South Korea’s 
total foreign exchange earnings over the period. 
Above all, Korea advanced into the huge U.S. market thanks to participation in 
the Vietnam War. The U.S. increased imports from Korea as part of the price of 
participation.  The increase ratio of U.S. imports doubled after participation in the 
Vietnam War. In particular, imports from Korea amazingly increased by 47.5 percent on 
a yearly average between 1965 and 1972. Imports of 35.6 million dollars in 1964 
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increased to 760 million dollars in 1972 - a 21 times increase. 96 Jung argued, as below, 
about this rapid increase of exporting to the U.S. 97 
U.S. market was not opened to all developing countries in 1960s. Late 
1960s, U.S. requested military alliance countries to buy weapon from U.S. 
to refrain military expenses paid by U.S. dollars under the “Buy America” 
policy. … However, U.S. did not apply this “Buy American” policy to 
Korea after Korea had sent troops to Vietnam. U.S. promised to expand 
imports from Korea and military aid to Korea for the price of the decision 
to send troops at Park Chung-hee and Johnson Summit in May 1965. 
Therefore, Korea could advance into U.S. market more easily than other 
developing countries. 
 
Table 11.   Summary of Exports and Imports. 1960-6998 
(In millions of  U.S. dollars) 
Exports Imports 
Year 
















1960 32.8 65.7 3.6 11.0 343.5 13.1 133.7 38.9 1.1 
1961 40.9 24.7 6.8 16.6 316.1 -8.0 143.4 45.4 5.6 
1962 54.8 34.0 12.0 21.9 421.8 33.4 220.3 52.2 2.2 
1963 86.8 58.4 24.3 28.0 560.3 32.8 284.1 50.7 9.1 
1964 119.1 37.2 35.6 29.9 404.4 -27.8 202.1 50.0 9.6 
1965 175.1 47.0 61.7 35.2 463.4 14.6 182.2 39.3 5.8 
1966 250.3 42.9 95.8 38.3 716.4 54.6 253.7 35.4 12.7 
1967 320.2 27.9 137.4 42.9 996.2 39.1 305.2 30.6 6.6 
1968 455.4 42.2 237.0 52.0 1,462.9 46.8 449.0 30.7 11.3 
1969 622.5 36.7 315.7 50.7 1,823.6 24.7 530.2 29.1 13.8 
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Another special favor from U.S. was made through contracts with Korean 
companies in service and construction areas. Construction companies concentrated 
mainly on building military bases, building for other military purposes, and bridge and 
civil engineering construction. The experience of construction and civil engineering 
accumulated in Vietnam later contributed to the acquisition of foreign currencies from 
overseas construction projects in the Middle East after mid the 1970s. If Koreans had not 
gained construction experience in Vietnam, construction exports to the Middle East might 
have been impossible.99  
Table 12.   Korean Construction Exports, 1965-78 
(new contracts awarded, in millions of dollars) 
Year Middle East Other areas Total 
1965 - 5.4 5.4 
1966 - 5.6 5.6 
1967 - 15.7 15.6 
1968 - 20.6 20.6 
1969 - 14.4 14.4 
1970 - 48.0 48.0 
1971 - 55.7 55.7 
1972 - 83.2 83.2 
1973 24.1 150.2 174.3 
1974 88.8 171.8 260.6 
1975 751.2 63.6 814.8 
1976 2,429.1 72.6 2,501.7 
1977 3,387.0 129.2 3,516.2 
1978 7,982.4 162.6 8,145.0 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The timing when the dispatch of troops issue was raised was during the period in 
which the Park Chung-hee’s power and control was questioned internally and externally. 
When the legitimacy of the military government which had taken the power in the May 
16 military coup was doubted, the Park administration decided to dispatch troops to 
Vietnam to improve the relationship with the U.S. and increase its approval rating with 
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economic growth. Koh explained, “Park’s 1965 decision to send ROK troops to Vietnam 
under U.S. prodding produced substantial payoffs and contributed appreciably to an 
improvement in Seoul-Washington relations.”100 
South Korea was able to solve its chronic insufficient foreign exchange reserve 
due to increased exports and financial aid from U.S. for the price of participation in the 
Vietnam War. Moreover, Korea acquired public loans with favorable conditions with 
support from the U.S., and it was much easier to obtain commercial loans with the solid 
security commitment of the U.S. after sending troops to Vietnam. As these financial 
resources were invested in the economic development plan driven by the government, the 
government’s approval rating gradually increased, and the intention of Park’s 
administration to maintain stability and continuity of the regime based on economic 
performance was realized. The economic development was a solid solution to ensure 
national security in the situation of military confrontation against North Korea.101 
 
                                                 
100 Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea: 212. 
101 Ibid., 233. 
 37
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER PRESIDENTS PARK 
AND PINOCHET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
East Asian countries have accomplished dramatic economic development through 
export-oriented growth policy since World War II. The East Asian model (EAM) concept 
emerged in the course of analyzing and organizing this “miracle-like” growth of East 
Asia. According to Koo, the development model of East Asia was established in four 
stages. First, formation of hard states with development-oriented leadership. Second, 
export-oriented industrialization through government’s intervention. Third, 
democratization by the middle-class, built up by economic development. And, fourth, 
deregulation, market opening and inroads into overseas markets. Therefore, it can be said 
East Asian countries have gone through authoritarian power, economic growth, political 
development and globalization.102 
Among these stages, the second one, export-oriented industrialization by 
intervention of government, is the representative feature of the “East Asian model.” 
South Korea is a typical EAM country showing all of the above features. In particular, 
Park’s administration contributed to formation of a hard state and export-oriented 
industrialization by the intervention of the government in the 1960s-1970s. South Korea’s 
average GNP growth rate in the 1960s was 10 percent. It was the most amazing speed of 
all other HPAEs countries.103 
It was impossible to foresee this type of growth rate in the 1950s when South 
Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world after liberation in 1945. After its 
independence, Korea was divided into North and South Korea and they have confronted 
each other since. Although South Korea held an election and elected Rhee Syng-man as 
the first President, social unrest continued and Communist guerrillas connected to North 
                                                 
102Koo, Developmental Model of East-Asia and Korea, 209-224: 5. 
103Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial 
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, 1-40: 1. 
 38
Korea, frequently appeared in the country. Moreover, the Korean War in 1950 devastated 
the Korean peninsula. The Rhee administration, which had to depend on the aid of the 
U.S., implemented import-substituting development, but political stability was a more 
urgent matter than economic development for the newly independent nation. 
In the contrast, Pinochet in Chile, who seized power by a coup in 1973 
implemented a neo-liberal reform policy totally different from the Park administration’s 
economic growth policy with intervention of the government. Neo-liberal reform is based 
on the economic theory of Friedman and Hayek. It prescribed monetarism as a 
macroeconomic policy to solve stagflation spread in advanced industrial countries and 
insisted on liberalism, deregulation and privatization policies to reduce intervention of the 
government.104 The “Chicago Boys,” who had learned neo-liberalism from Friedman, 
actively adapted it to the economic policies of Chile. 
The concept of neo-liberalism is almost the same as the so-called Washington 
Consensus and orthodoxy since they are based on identical economic principles: 1) low 
inflation and fiscal deficit, 2) market opening through trading and capital liberalization, 
and 3) strengthening market mechanisms through deregulation and privatization.105 Neo-
liberalism was born to solve problems of Western European and advanced countries, and 
the Washington Consensus was a comprehensive economic policy presented for 
developing countries.106 
Chile had implemented import substitution industrialization (ISI) through 
protectionism before Pinochet. However, Pinochet overturned this with his neo-liberalism 
and export-led growth policy. Pinochet’s administration in 1970 was a pioneer of neo-
liberalism believing the market is more effective than government. Neo-liberal reforms of 
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Chile spread to Latin America and other developing countries in the 1980s.107 The neo-
liberal reforms later became a basis of Western European countries’ economic policies in 
the 1980s with support from President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, of the UK. 
Chile’s GDP grew more than 50 percent between 1975 and 1981 through neo-liberal 
reforms; inflation dropped, and resource industries (copper, fruit, fishing and forestry) 
were prosperous.108 However, despite the economic growth, Chile suffered a debt crisis 
in 1980 and the radical market liberalization had to be revised. Consequently, Chile 
pursued pragmatic market liberalization with the intervention of the state. 
While Park and Pinochet had common interests for the establishment of a 
powerful military regime through a coup, they followed significantly different economic 
growth strategies, an economic growth strategy with the intervention of the state and a 
market-oriented economic growth strategy. The thesis will now review the differences of 
both countries’ economic growth policy. 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARK’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
PINOCHET’S 
Park’s regime implemented an economic growth policy ten years earlier than 
Pinochet. Park Chung-hee had been the leader of South Korea for 18 years (1961-79), 
and Pinochet had been the leader of Chile for 17 years (1973-90). The military 
government of Park and Pinochet were models of economic growth for other developing 
countries. These models are called the “Dragon” or the “Tiger” due to their economic 
growth. The big difference between two models was the role of government. The 
government designed an economic development plan and adopted active state 
intervention policies in South Korea. However, Chile preferred the effectiveness of the 
market, and pursued a market-oriented policy which minimized intervention of the state. 
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Before Park and Pinochet, both South Korea and Chile had adopted protectionism 
and import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Park maintained protectionism and 
replaced ISI with EOI. The role of government was critical in the Park regime’s EOI 
economic growth strategy. On the contrary, Pinochet implemented powerful neo-liberal 
restructuring policy excluding protectionism. Owing to this policy, the economy of Chile 
turned into “an open, free-market economy based on agro-extractive exports’ from ‘a 
highly protected industrializing economy.”109 
1. The Relationships Between the Bureaucrats and Capitalists 
Park’s military regime concentrated its power on the administration to prepare an 
organizational basis for economic growth. These organizations were blocked from 
political stakeholders, and implemented powerful economic growth policies. The power 
of Park’s military government and political insulation were important factors to 
accomplish the market-conforming strategy. A small cadre of technocrats tried economic 
reform during Rhee’s government. They failed since they were not Korea’s main power. 
However, Park’s government formed a powerful bureaucracy through restructuring. Also, 
various specialists were appointed to the government departments. 
In Chile, however, capital groups deeply intervened in economic policy-making. 
The internationalist conglomerates which wanted radical liberal reforms in 1970s needed 
a powerful regime to implement those reforms. Pinochet also needed support from the 
internationalists for national stability after the coup. The internationalists influenced 
Pinochet’s government to push their desired economic policies through this mutually 
collaborative relationship. Silva explains:110 
The internationalist conglomerates’ first victory came in April 1975, with 
the appointment of Sergio de Castro to the Ministry of Economy, Pablo 
Baraona as president of the Central Bank, and Francisco Soza as vice 
president of CORFO. All had close business and/or personal ties to either 
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the Cruzat-Larrain or the BHC internationalist conglomerates. De Castro 
was an intimate friend of Manuel Cruzat, one of the two major figures of 
the Cruzat-Larrain economic group. By the same token, Soza and Baraona 
were also on the board of directors of prominent Cruzat-Larrain 
companies. Cauas, who continued as minister of finance and sponsored 
drastic deflation, became the president of leading Cruzat-Larrain-
controlled financial institutions and served on the board of directors of 
many Cruzat-Larrain companies. 
In the early 1980s, the radical economic reforms caused a debt crisis and collapse 
in Chile’s economy. Many economists pointed to policies which could not control the 
financial system as a reason of the failure of Chile’s economy, but Silva put more focus 
on the mutual relationship between policymakers and top capitalists.111 
The evidence suggests that damaging policies may result when a highly 
autonomous state overinsulates ideologically rigid technocrats with 
organic links to a narrow range of business interests operating outside the 
confines of business peak associations. These characteristics can lead to 
harmful policies, policies too skewed for healthy economic growth that, in 
Chile at least, ended in economic disaster. The contrast to investment and 
growth patterns in the following policy period, within the same military 
government but with a different system of collaboration between business 
and policymakers, is instructive: productive investment as a percentage of 
GDP increased steadily. 
Internationalists who had significantly influenced radical neo-liberal reforms in 
the 1970s in Chile established a pragmatic neo-liberal coalition with domestic 
businessmen and landowners after the debt crisis.112 Therefore, although interests of 
internationalists were still important, the domestic market’s interests were considered a 
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interests of a pragmatic coalition as Ministers of Finance and Economy. This meant the 
pragmatic coalition’s network extended to the nation, and the capitalist group influenced 
the policy-making continuously.113 
In the case of Park’s regime, although capitalists played an important role in 
economic growth, they were less powerful than Chile’s capitalists when making national 
economic policies since the major officials of Park’s government were mostly former 
soldiers. The relationship between policymakers and capitalists is greatly related to 
whether government-led economic development policies or market-oriented policies are 
selected. 
2. Economic Development Policy: State Intervention vs. Market-
Oriented 
When Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, the South Korean economy was a 
strictly controlled economy as a result of economic policies Japan had implemented in 
wartime. In these circumstances, the U.S. military administration tried to apply a liberal 
economic system as in the U.S. to South Korea, but this caused controversial arguments 
about which economic system was suitable for Korea. The result of the argument was 
reached by political consideration rather than theoretical comparison. The U.S. 
government, which contributed more than 50 percent of Korean government’s budget, 
wanted to implant U.S.-type economic policies into South Korea, and the Rhee 
government, which could not survive without support from the U.S. government, had to 
comply.114 
However, Park’s government emphasized the role of government in economic 
development compared to previous governments. 115  They established a five-year 
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economic development plan to drive economic growth. This plan was similar to Japan’s 
economic development strategies which emphasized the government’s control rather  
than autonomous regulations of the market.116 
The five-year economic development plan began in 1962 and was a master plan to 
set up the direction of national economic growth and concentrate all the capabilities of 
the country. The state instructed and encouraged companies and all citizens, as well as 
the government, to accomplish the plan. In terms of macro-economies, the state 
instructed companies through its powerful bureaucracy, and companies strived to 
accomplish the goals in terms of micro-economies. 
While the first and second economic development plan (1962-1966, 1967-1971) 
were mainly to promote light industries and build a basis for other industries, the third 
and fourth economic development plans (1972-76, 1977-81) focused on cultivating heavy 
and chemical industries. The fostering of heavy and chemical industries, which inevitably 
needed economies of scale in 1970, was an opportunity to grow conglomerates. Thanks 
to the full-fledged support from government, the conglomerates made inroads into 
petrochemical, steel, cement, shipbuilding and machinery industries. Global companies 
like Samsung Electronics, POSCO, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Hyundai Heavy Industries 
were born in this period.117 
Although Park Chung-hee pursued capitalism, he did not select original free 
market policies. He concentrated economic power in the Ministry of Economic Planning 
Board after grasping political power, and nationalized domestic banks to obtain strict 
control of economic policy-making, fiscal budgets and companies.118 The government 
decided the goal of the economic policy and the economic plan, the priority of capital 
distribution, rules of competition, and import-export policies, and supervised 
participating private companies. In other words, the government implemented control or 
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management policies based on adopted revised capitalism by actively intervening in the 
macroeconomic area. The instances of intervention policies were subsidies in the types of 
financing and financing at low interest, tax benefits for industries selected as strategic 
industries, promoting export by financing, foreign exchange, investment permission, 
protecting domestic industries with subsidies, tariff walls, loan denominated foreign 
currency and capping the interest rate, and strict and thorough supervision by the 
government. Until the early 1980’s, most Korean industries were protected by a non-tariff 
wall.119 
Pinochet implemented a neoliberal economic restructuring program in 1973.120 
While Korea emphasized the role of the state in economic growth, Chile believed a 
liberal market was more effective than intervention by the state. The neo-liberal policies 
of Pinochet can be divided into three periods. The first was from 1973-75 when the 
previous import substitution policy was gradually revised, and the second period was 
from 1975-82 when radical neoliberal policies were implemented. The third period was 
1983-88 when pragmatic neoliberal policies were conducted.121 The second period, when 
radical neoliberal reforms were implemented, was the most distinct economic policy 
period for Pinochet’s regime. The “Chicago Boys,” 122 those who had been educated in 
the U.S., carried out strong neoliberal reforms with support from Pinochet to establish 
market rule. Clapp said:123 
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The first step in establishing market rule was to eliminate the accretion of 
barriers to trade established during the previous 40 years, and the new 
team opted for shock measures rather than gradualism. The government 
abolished protective tariffs outright, replacing them with a uniform import 
tax of 10 percent. … The critical element of the new economic policy, 
however, was the privatization of 437 of 507 state enterprises, intended to 
generate an irreversible structural change in the Chilean economy. 
Reid stated that the Chicago Boys lowered protective tariffs to 10 percent, which 
had risen up to 750 percent, and privatized state-run companies.124 Silva continued to 
explain the Pinochet’s economic restructuring program as follows.125 
Between 1975 and 1982 Chile experimented with radical neoliberal 
policies in the construction of a liberal economy and society. These 
policies included draconian economic stabilization programs (shock 
therapy) and the rapid, thorough liberalization of capital markets, prices, 
and trade with little regard for their effects on industrial and agricultural 
sectors that had difficulty adjusting. The introduction of a fixed exchange 
rate in 1979 became the centerpiece of a system of automatic economic 
adjustment, after which the top policymakers believed that their main role 
would be to act as gatekeepers against interest groups that wanted to 
change the rules of the game. 
Chile’s neo-liberal reforms, driven by the Chicago Boys, was at stake due to a 
debt crisis in the early 1980s. The GDP dropped by 14.5 percent between 1982 and 1983 
and income per capita fell by more than 19 percent, while the unemployment ratio 
increased by almost 30 percent.126 When the free market economy collapsed, Chile tried 
to find a more pragmatic economic growth policy. The new economic team of Pinochet’s 
government strove to correct the failures of the Chicago Boys, but they also did not 
change the existing neo-liberal approach.127 Silva explained:128 
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In 1984 Chile’s economy began to recover under a much more flexible 
approach to the construction of a liberal economy, dubbed “pragmatic 
neoliberalism” by Chileans. Policymakers in the financial institutions still 
preferred neutral policy instruments. But they acknowledged that the state 
also had a duty to intervene in markets, particularly to stabilize prices and 
boost domestic production, albeit with the most market-friendly 
instruments available. Thus, the government controlled financial markets 
more and insured that real exchange rates remained high, interest rates 
were reasonable, agricultural and mining activities were protected by price 
floors, and manufactures received protection from unfair external 
competition as well as incentives to export. 
3. Export-oriented Policy: Manufacturing Industry vs. Extractive 
Industry 
The export-oriented industrialization policy, a core factor of successful economic 
growth in South Korea, was adopted in the situation because the private sector was still 
immature. Capital, technology and management abilities were all insufficient in South 
Korea. Therefore, the state took a step forward to protect and instruct industries, and 
encouraged private companies to participate in the program to use the advantages of the 
capitalistic market system. Krueger, former First Deputy Managing Director of IMF, 
appraised that Korea was successful because it pursued an export-driven system based on 
market incentives despite the state’s intervention.129 
Unlike South Korea, where natural resources are in short supply, the agricultural 
and resource sectors were a main part of economic growth of Chile. Before Pinochet, 
Chile was successful in the late 1960s as it conducted protective policies like other South 
American countries. 130  However, excessive protectionism was ineffective for many 
industrial firms, and they neglected to export unlike East Asian models.131 In this state, 
Pinochet drove export-oriented economic growth policies while hoping commodity 
exports would play a great role in economic growth. He believed the market would do 
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rather than the state. 132  Kurt Weyland said, “The market reforms imposed by the 
Pinochet regime made exports the engine of Chile’s economic development. Throughout 
the late 1980s, most exports were primary commodities.” 133 Clapp argued that134 
Chilean economic policy under military rule is represented as a complete 
break with the development model of the previous 40 years, dispensing 
with sectoral economic policies and accepting the judgment of the market 
in determining the winners according to the laws of comparative 
advantage (Villarreal 1990; Gallagher 1992). In the process, the country 
has exchanged a broad program of import substitution industrialization for 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis identified two factors in regards to why Park’s government could 
accomplish such high-speed economic growth compared to Rhee’s government. Park’s 
military government provided powerful impetus and organization due to characteristics of 
military culture, and the export-oriented policy allowed an economy of scale by 
overcoming an insufficiency of natural resources and a narrow domestic market. The 
military regime provided political concentration to South Korea, a country that lacked 
experience in democracy. Leaders of the military regime, including Park, were elites who 
had studied in Manchuria and Japan, and they employed technocrats who could provide 
professional knowledge. The export-oriented industrialization policy was a successful 
policy approach for South Korea to develop its economy. South Korea had almost no 
natural resources, except for human resources. Capital was the most essential factor for 
the industrialization of Korea, but South Korea was one of poorest countries in the world. 
Therefore, foreign investment was definitely needed. The government guaranteed 
companies that borrowed foreign capital, and borrowed foreign funds by using the 
revenue earned by mine workers and nurses who went to Germany to earn money as 
collateral. 
What if Rhee’s government had implemented an export-oriented economic 
policy? Would it have been possible to realize high-speed economic development a 
Park’s government did? The answer is negative. The powerful drive of Park was possible 
due to Park and his many followers in the military. High positions in the administration 
and Assembly were filled by former military officers who had served with Park, and they 
successfully assisted with his economic policies. Although Rhee’s regime was also an 
authoritarian regime, it did not have the political stability and powerful policy drive since 
it did not have support from the powerful military. 
State intervention was successful in South Korea, but all developing countries are 
not successful with intervention by the state. Chalmers Johnson asserts that since Korea 
had insufficient natural resources, industrialization was the only option to develop its 
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economy. Moreover, he said Park Chung-hee was able to learn from the former 
president’s mistakes and Japan’s economic model.135 Chun argued that a “state of siege” 
caused by North Korea continuously reminded people of a sense of crisis, and they 
accomplished economic growth to survive. He instanced Israel, Taiwan and Singapore as 
similar examples. 136  Si-yoon Kim argues that circumstances within or without of a 
specific country are not directly related to its economic results, and he believes the ability 
of the political leader is the most important factor. 137 
Natural resources played an important part in the economic growth of Chile. 
South Korea was at the forefront in the Cold War and the national economy was greatly 
dependent on aid from the U.S. while internationalists significantly influenced Chile’s 
economic policy. Korea watched and learned from the economic growth model of Japan; 
Chile, however, was greatly influenced by the Chicago school in the U.S. These different 
circumstances caused Chile to select a market-oriented economic development policy and 
Korea to select a state-intervention economic development policy. 
The relationship between the state and private companies also significantly 
influenced economic growth policies. Since major high officials in South Korea were 
mostly former soldiers, the influence of private companies in South Korea was relatively 
small. In the case of Chile, major government officials were directly and indirectly 
related to companies, and in which they had interests their economic policies for the 
government were connected with interests of the companies related to them. The two 
different relationships between bureaucrats and capitalists were also derived from the 
differences between a state-led economic development policy and a market-oriented 
policy. 
At least one thing is common between South Korea and Chile. The individual 
capability of Park and Pinochet played a significant role. Both men brought a military 
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regime to strongly push economic growth strategy ahead. Like the export-oriented policy 
of Park, Pinochet’s neo-liberal reforms would not have been possible without strong 
support from the military regime.138 The economic growth strategy of the two countries 
were opposite in the early period. However, South Korea has pursued liberalism since 
1980s, and Chile has implemented pragmatic liberalism since its debt crisis. A state 
intervention policy and a liberalism policy, in the early economic growth policies of both 
countries, were appropriate. It appears that the gap between the two countries’ policies 
has narrowed as time has passed. 
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